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Comments and Casenotes
INDIGENT COURT COSTS AND BAIL: CHARGE
THEM TO EQUAL PROTECTION
By ALAN R. SACHS
Ask not what singular charm the men of democratic ages find
in being equal, or what special reasons they may have for clinging
so tenaciously to equality rather than to the other advantages
which society holds out to them: equality is the distinguishing
characteristic of the age they live in; that, of itself, is enough to
explain that they prefer it to all the rest.*
The adoption of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States was society's response to an era characterized by
racial discrimination. The embodiment of the equal protection clause
within the amendment was society's attempt to vitiate that discrimina-
'tion and to place all men, regardless of race, upon equal footing before
the law. It was not surprising, therefore, -that, when the Supreme Court
was first called upon to interpret the equal protection clause in the
Slaughter-House Case,' ,it propounded: "We doubt very much -whether
any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the
Negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held -to come
within the purview of [the equal protection] . . . provision."'2 Yet,
as generations passed, the doubt cast by the Slaughter-House Cases
was slowly but surely dispelled, and the equal protection clause de-
veloped from what Mr. Justice Holmes once labeled "the usual last
resort of constitutional arguments"' into a powerful buttress to be
used against any 'type of unreasonable discrimination.'
The scope of this article, however, is limited to 'the role -that the
equal protection clause has played and still must play in alleviating
discrimination in modern criminal procedure.5 More specifically, it
is the purpose of this article to trace the evolution and implementation
of the equal protection clause in -the effort to end discrimination against
the indigent criminal defendant in the two closely interrelated areas
of appellate review and bail.
* ALEXIS De TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835-1840; trans. Henry
Reeves, 1838-1840).
1. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
2. Id. at 81.
3. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
4. See, e.g., notes 7, 13 and 14 infra.
5. Mr. Chief Justice Warren has appropriately stated:
The quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the method
it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law. When those methods result in
arbitrary inequality because of race, indigence or otherwise, the nation as a whole
suffers as well as those who are the victims of the inequality.
Attorney General Kennedy's National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice (1964).
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The Supreme Court's various interpretations of the equal pro-
tection clause led to what was labeled as a paradox :6 the equal protection
of the laws was held to be a "pledge of the protection of equal laws,"'
but at the same time it did ". . . not require things which [were] dif-
ferent in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the
same. ' As a result, the Supreme Court took a middle stand and
found certain legislative discrimination to be constitutionally tolerable.9
Discrimination was constitutionally tolerable if it rested upon a rea-
sonable classification,' ° and classification was reasonble if it was "based
upon some real and substantial distinction, bearing a reasonable and
just relation to the things in respect to which such classification [was]
imposed," and if it was not "arbitrarily made without any substantial
basis."" The constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws
thus came to be defined negatively; that is, there was no denial of
equal protection of the laws if there was no invidious discrimination.
If "class legislation . . . [carried] out a public purpose [and if] it
affect[ed] alike all persons similarly situated,"' 2 the classification
was reasonable, the discrimination constitutionally tolerable, and there
was no denial of equal protection of the laws.
Yet this essentially negative rule requiring reasonable classifica-
tion did not answer a more fundamental question in the interpretation
of the clause. Although the equal protection clause prohibited the
creation of inequalities -by the enactment of invidiously discriminatory
legislation, how was the clause to be interpreted in relation to existing
inequalities - those inequalities not created by legislation, but those
inequalities intrinsic to society, such as wealth and indigence, which in
and of themselves resulted in the denial to indigents of those procedures
to which the non-indigent had access ?13
This was the question before -the Supreme Court when, for the
first time, it decided the impact of poverty on constitutional rights
arising under the fourteenth amendment in the fountainhead case of
6. Tussman and ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
Rgv. 341, 344 (1949).
7. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
8. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
9. The Court, in upholding the constitutionality of a Texas anti-trust law that
made it a crime to conspire to fix the retail price of beer, but not a crime to conspire
to fix the retail price of agricultural products or live stock in the hands of the
producer or raiser, said: "The equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is
not a disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins 'the equal protection
of the laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions." Ibid.
10. Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1909); Missouri v. Lewis, 101
U.S. 22 (1879) ; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885). Cf. Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475 (1954); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). The Court,
in Missouri v. Lewis, recognized that the equal protection clause contemplated
. ..persons and classes of persons. It [had] not respect to ... regulations
that [did] not injuriously affect or discriminate between persons or classes of
persons within [the area] for which such regulations [were] made. . . . It
means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of
the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place
and under like circumstances.
Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30-31 (1879).
11. Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 417 (1909).
12. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
13. See note 70 infra and accompanying text.
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Griffin v. Illinois.14 The statute in Griffin differed from all others
previously invalidated on equal protection grounds in that neither on
its face did it invidiously discriminate, nor had it been arbitrarily
applied.' 5 Yet, in effect, the statute denied the class of indigent criminals
from perfecting full appellate review as if it had expressly so provided.
The majority of the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, held
that the denial to indigents in non-capital cases of the right to a free
transcript, which was necessary in order to obtain full review, 6 was
a denial of the equal protection of the laws because only non-i-ndigents
could buy a transcript and obtain full appellate review.'7 In opposition
to the majority's holding, however, a fundamental difference in prin-
ciple as to the meaning of the equal protection clause was clearly
evidenced by the dissent."8 As the dissent saw the issues, no denial
of equal protection of the laws existed:
[C]ertainly Illinois does not deny equal protection to con-
victed defendants when the terms of appeal are open to all, although
some may not be able to avail themselves of the full appeal because
of their poverty. Illinois is not bound to make the defendants
economically equal before the bar of justice. 9
Mr. Justice Harlan in his own dissent added that the majority opinion
produced "the anomalous result that a constitutional admonition to the
states to treat all persons equally means in this instance that Illinois
14. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Petitioners in Griffin were convicted of armed robbery.Immediately after their conviction, they filed a motion alleging indigency, asking that
a stenographic transcript of the trial proceedings be furnished them without cost, sinceit was necessary to provide the appellate court with a bill of exceptions in order to getfull appellate review, and such a bill could not be prepared without a transcript of
the trial proceedings. Id. at 13. By Illinois law, a free transcript was provided toindigents under a death sentence, but in all other criminal cases, those defendants who
needed a transcript had to purchase it themselves. The trial court denied petitioners'
motion despite protests that to do so would deny them the equal protection of the laws.
15. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The Court in holding a SanFrancisco ordinance invalid as denying equal protection of the laws by conferring on
a supervisor the ". . . naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold consent [from
the giving of an application to build and carry on a laundry business within the city
limits] ..." stated:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance . ..ifit is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequalhand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between personsin similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the Constitution.
Id. at 373-74.
16. The Court conceded that due process did not require the state to provide
appellate review at all, but went on to say:
* * ' [T]hat is not to say that a State that does grant appellate review cando so in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants on account
of their poverty. . . . [Alt all stages of the proceedings the ...Equal Protection
Clause protect[s] persons like petitioners from invidious discriminations.
351 U.S. at 18.
17. The majority decision was also based upon due process grounds. Mr. JusticeFrankfurter concurred on equal protection grounds. But see Willcox & Bloustein,
The Griffin Case - Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1,
12 (1957).
18. Four Justices dissented: Burton, Harlan, Minton, and Reed. Harlan also
wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
19. 351 U.S. at 28.
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must give to some what it -equires others to pay for."2  He then
sharpened the issue, stating:
[T]he real issue ... is not whether Illinois 'has discriminated
but whether it -has the duty to discriminate... [This] is not the
typical equal protection question of the reasonableness of a
"classification" on -the -basis of which the ,State has imposed legal
disabilities, but rather the reasonableness of the State's failure
to remove natural disabilities. The Court -holds that the failure
of the State to do so is constitutionally unreasonable in this case
although it might not be in others.2
There was the rub! The majority and minority differed as to the very
nature of our judicial -system and the role that the Supreme Court
should play in our democratic society.22 The majority of the Court
found in favor of Griffin 'because -it felt that it was the duty of the
state to provide its citizens with the practical means for securing
equal justice under the Constitution. Without these means justice was
sheer theory. Only if the means were provided could justice be realisti-
cally carried out. On the other 'hand, the minority of the Court felt that
the state's duty to its citizens was fulfilled if it made justice available to
them. While the majority felt that the state had an affirmative constitu-
tional duty to overcome the effect of poverty, the minority did not."
The Court had weighed the state interests concerned24 'against the
seriousness of the invidious classification and had found the scales
so overbalanced as to necessitate affirmative state action to restore
20. Id. at 34. It was Harlan's contention that the decision amounted to an affirma-
tive discrimination in favor of the poor by giving to the indigent free what the affluent
was forced to buy.
21. Id. at 35-36. Harlan's reasoning stemmed from his analogy to the require-
ment of tuition at a state university. He contended that while exclusion of indigents
per se from free state universities would deny them equal protection of the laws, the
requirement of tuition fees, which would have the practical effect of excluding in-
digents, would not. Thus, if the imposition of payment were not an invidious classifica-
tion in the case of state universities, it should not be so regarded here. But the denial
of appellate review because of indigence was considered by the Court to lay on a
different plane than that of indigents' attendance at state universities:
The provision of applied justice is an essential function of the State even
under the most conservative political theory. It is of the essence of citizenship
that a person have access to the state's legal institutions. Without this he is with-
out full citizenship. . . . We cannot conceive of a man as truly a citizen if he
is too poor to have access to the courts, we can, however, conceive of him as truly
a citizen if he is too poor to receive [an education at a State University]. [A]
state which . . . provides all its citizens with applied justice is . . . only giving
all men that which is the most basic function of government, the provision of
legal process.
43 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 16 (1957).
22. See 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 13-17 (1957).
23. Ibid.
24. The state's objectives in providing free transcripts only to indigents convicted
of capital offenses were two fold: (a) It saved the state much needless expense in
providing stenographic transcripts to all indigents no matter how insignificant the
offense for which they were convicted. (b) "[TIhat as the cost ... of a transcript is
a significant deterrent to frivolous appeals by non-indigents; and that as indigents are
not subject to this self-regulating mechanism, they will impose a heavy burden upon
the state unless their appeals are subject to some form of control." 113 U. PA. L. Riv.
1125, 1158 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
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the equilibrium.25 However, the Court was not oblivious to the potential
impact of its decision upon the federal-state relationship. Thus, the
exact affirmative action demanded was left to Illinois to determine,26
the only qualification being that it afford the indigent as "adequate
and effective appellate review"2 7 "as those who have money enough to
buy transcripts."2"
The Griffin rule was the first step in a conscious response by the
Supreme Court to eliminate the invidious effect of state statutes
governing criminal procedure. Since it had become a truism that "fed-
eral authority operate[d] in areas where a uniform and national
.standard should obtain .... 9 it appeared that the Supreme Court
had declared a universal principle - the principle that discrimination,
even when not affirmative, on the basis of indigence was a violation
of the fourteenth amendment. Perhaps the Court was motivated by
its recent application of the equal protection clause in the Negro egali-
tarian revolution,"0 but whatever the reason, the indigent was now
equipped with a tool to aid him in his quest for equal justice.
Soon after Griffin, it was held that a state trial court's refusal
to give indigent defendants a free trial transcript (which foreclosed
appellate review) on the ground that justice would not be promoted
and that no grave or prejudicial errors occurred during trial was a
denial of the equal protection of the laws, since, without a prelimi-
nary ruling by the trial court, there was a right to full appellate
review by all defendants who could afford the expense of a transcript 8 '
The following year, the Court applied the Griffin rule in holding it
to be a violation of the fourteenth amendment for an indigent to be fore-
closed from access to the second phase of appellate review by requiring
the payment of a filing fee 'before the state supreme court would hear
an appeal. 2 In Draper v. Washington,33 a state practice, which was
used to screen applications by indigents for transcripts, was held to be
invalid even though a transcript was not 'required for full appellate
review, where a non-indigent could obtain a more complete appellate
review with a transcript. The Draper Court made it clear beyond a
doubt that it was now the "daty of the State . . .to provide the indi-
gent as adequate and effective an appellate review as that given appel-
lants with funds. The state [had to] provide the indigent defendant
with means of presenting his contentions to -the appellate court which
25. But cf. Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) ; Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945) (The Court weighed racial discrimination against national
security during the Second World War and held the national interest to prevail.).
26. The Court held that a stenographic transcript was not required in every case
where an indigent could not buy one. A bystander's bill of exceptions could be used
in some instances as well as other methods of reporting trial proceedings. 351 U.S.
at 20.
27. Cf. Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963) ("Exact equality is no prerequisite
of equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 423.).
28. 351 U.S. at 19.
29. Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 945, 946 (1964).
30. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. Eskridge v. Washington, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
32. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
33. 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
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[were] as good as those available to a non-indigent defendant with
similar contentions."'
The requirements -that the indigent have equal access to and as
adequate and effective appellate review as the non-indigent, moreover,
were not limited to direct appeals by indigents from criminal convic-
tions, but were held applicable to post-conviction proceedings as well.
In Smith v. Bennett the Supreme Court 'held that a state's failure
to extend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to indigent defen-
dants by requiring a filing fee was violative of the equal protection
clause. "Respecting the -State's grant of a right to test their detention,
the Fourteenth Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor
criminals in equal scale, and its hand extends as far to each." 6
Although Smith v. Bennett marked the first application of the
equal protection clause in the state post-conviction procedural area,
the Court's sweeping language was indicative that the full weight of
Griffin was yet to be felt. In Lane v. Brown,37 a convicted murderer,
sentenced to death, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis
in his Indiana trial court. After a hearing at which the defendant
Brown was represented by the Public Defender, the court denied relief.
The Public Defender, finding no error or errors committed at the hear-
ing, refused to represent Brown in perfecting an appeal to the Indiana
Supreme Court. Brown's subsequent application to the trial court for
appointment of counsel and free transcript in the coram nobis hearing
was denied because the Public Defender, the only person under Indiana
law who could request and procure a free transcript in a coram nobis
hearing for an indigent, refused to do so. Brown sought habeas corpus
in the federal district court, which reversed the Supreme Court of
Indiana, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, affirm-
ing the court of appeals, held that the refusal of the Indiana Public
Defender to procure a transcript, which was required for an appeal
from the denial of the writ of coram nobis, was a denial of the equal
protection of the laws in view of the fact that such an appeal could
have been maintained by -those who had funds to procure a transcript.
The defect with such a procedure, the Court explained, was that it
produced the anomalous result of "confer[ring] upon a state officer
outside the judicial system power to take from an indigent all hope
of any appeal at all."3  As in the case of direct appeals,39 the state's
effective preclusion of indigents from appellate review of post-conviction
proceedings after the state had previously provided one review on the
34. Id. at 496. The Court affirmed the principle announced in Griffin that the
state need not "purchase a stenographer's transcript in every case where a defendant
cannot buy it," 351 U.S. at 20, but held that the record before the Supreme Court of
Washington composed solely of the hearing of the motion for a free transcript of the
record was not of "sufficient completeness" as to afford the petitioners as adequate
and effective a review of their claims of error as that which a non-indigent had by
providing a transcript. See also Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
35. 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
36. Id. at 714.
37. 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
38. Td. at 485.
39. See Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
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merits was held to be a breach of the constitutional guarantee of the
equal protection of the laws.
The latest Supreme Court pronouncement in this area, Long v.
District Court of Iowa,4° holding that an available and easily furnished
transcript must be provided -to an indigent in order to enable him to
perfect an appeal from an adverse hearing upon a writ of habeas corpus,
makes it clear that Griffin, in the future, will require that a free tran-
script or other "adequate alternative" be provided the indigent on appeal
of -any post-conviction proceeding from which an appeal is fully avail-
able to the non-indigent.
The Griffin requirement of affirmative state action was thus made
applicable to all types of state appeals. Implementation of that require-
ment, however, fell into an area of administrative procedure that the
Court was not well fitted to handle. It involved an area which was
previously left almost entirely to state regulation. It was the state
which was immediately concerned with the guilt or innocence of the
criminal defendant, be he indigent or affluent, and -it was the state
which regulated its criminal procedure in a manner most expedient
to its needs.4 Although it was recently urged that since "... equality
demands uniformity of rules . . . [and] uniformity [of rules] cannot
exist if there are multiple rule makers . . . the objective of equality
can be achieved only by the elimination of authorities not subordinate
to the central power . . "42 the tenor of the Court's decisions evi-
denced a conscious effort to fit the new principle into the concept of
federalism. In each case, it was left to the state to provide the necessary
means for full appellate review. The state was never restricted to pro-
viding only transcripts. This occurred not only through the Court's
recognition of the fact that there was a legitimate state interest involved,
but also because the Court felt -that the state could best deal with the
attendant economic and administrative problems.
While the Supreme Court was -laboring over the question of the
requirement of equal protection of the laws in state cases, the same ques-
tion presented itself in the federal arena. Here, however, the question
was one step further removed. There was no equal protection clause in
the fifth amendment. But this did not hamper the Supreme Court from
effectively requiring the equal protection of the laws in federal as
well as state courts. 43 The equal protection clause prohibited invidious
discrimination. The fundamental fairness requirement of the fifth
40. 385 U.S. 192 (1966).
41. See generally Schaefer, Federal and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L.
Rv. 1 (1956).
42. 78 HARV. L. Rnv. 143, 144 (1964).
43. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The Court, in applying the privilege
against self-incrimination to the states, declared: "It would be incongruous to have
different standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same
feared prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal
court. Therefore, the same standards must determine whether an accused's silence in
either a federal or state proceeding is justified." Id. at 11. (Emphasis added.) See
also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). The Court, after indicating that equal pro-
tion is a ". .. part of the public policy of the United States," said that it would violate
this policy ". . . to permit federal courts in the Nation's capital to exercise general
equitable powers to compel action denied the state courts where such action has been
held to be violative of the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 35.
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amendment's due process clause also dictated that once a privilege
was granted, it could not be arbitrarily applied to some while with-held
from others.44 This was what Mr. Chief Justice Taft intimated when
he said: ". . . the due process clause .. . tends to secure equality of
law in the sense that it makes a required minimum of protection for
everyone's right of life, liberty, and property, which Congress .. .
may not withhold. Our whole system of law is predicated on the general,
fundamental principle of equality of application of the law."45 There
was the overlap which existed between due process and equal protection
through which the Court found the requirements of equal protection
to be implicit in the fifth amendment. In practicality, it became the rule
in the federal courts that a denial of equal protection violated the
fundamental fairness required by due process.46
Although in federal courts appeal from a district court's judg-
ment of conviction was a matter of right,4 7 the defendant had to first
provide the court of appeals with a transcript and record on appeal.48
The affluent individual, -having been able to purchase his transcript and
to docket his appeal, the court of appeals proceeded to hear the appeal
on the merits, if it had not already been dismissed on motion by the
Government.
If a defendant could not afford to purchase a transcript and record
on appeal, he could perfect his appeal only by applying for leave to
appeal in -forma pauperis. 9  The application, however, was subject to
44. See, e.g., Dunn v. United States, ___ F.2d - (1967).
45. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921).
46. This becomes apparent when the following sequence of cases is studied. In
Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), Chief Justice Stone clearly implied
that Congressional legislation, which classifies according to race, may be so discrimi-
natory as to violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment. While the ma-jority of the Court in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) held the
national security interest to outweigh what might otherwise amount to invidious classi-
fication (classification according to race), Mr. Justice Murphy's dissent was emphatic
that racial classification by Congress deprived "all those within its scope of the equal
protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 234-35. In
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947), the petitioners contended that a Con-
gressional statute denied equal protection of the laws to radio broadcasters as a class
and, for this reason violated the due process clause. The Supreme Court reversed the
district court and held that Congress had not transgressed the "limits of the power" to
enact laws that did "not apply equally to all classes, groups, and persons, ...in the
provisions of the statute which are here attacked." Id. at 9. This opinion of Mr. Justice
Black came "close to an open avowal that the due process clause embodies all of the
classification requirements of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth." 37 CALIF.
L. Riv. 341, 363 (1949). And in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court,
in holding racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia to be
a denial of due process, explicitly read the guarantees of equal protection into the
fifth amendment's due process clause. Contra, Detroit Bank v. United States, 317
U.S. 329 (1943) ("[The Fifth Amendment] . . . provides no guarantee against dis-
criminating legislation of Congress." Id. at 337.)
47. FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a).
48. FED. R. CRIM. P. 39 (b).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964)
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prose-
cution or defense of any suit, action, or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal
therein, without prepayment of fees and costs. ...
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in
writing that it is not taken in good faith.(b) In any ... criminal case the court may, upon the filing of a like affidavit,
direct the expense of printing the record on appeal, .. . be paid by the United
States. . ..
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denial by the trial judge upon his certification that the appeal was not
taken in "good faith," i.e., when the defendant sought appellate review
of frivolous issues.5 Yet, if an indigent appealed from the district
court's certification that his appeal was not taken in good faith, would
he be afforded a free transcript in order to enable his counsel to establish
the existence of non-frivolous issues before -the court of appeals? This
was the question reached in Johnson v. United States,"' in which the
Supreme Court held that the defendant, whose application for leave
to appeal in forma pauperis had been denied by the district court,
could seek identical relief from the court of appeals, which was
required to assign counsel. and assure the defendant of an "adequate
means of presenting a fair basis for determining whether the District
Court's certification was warranted, '52 whenever the substance of the
defendant's grounds for appeal could not be adequately ascertained
from the face of the application. If the court of appeals was able to
find the existence of non-frivolous issues, it would then grant leave to
appeal in forma pauperis, -and subsequently dispose of the appeal on
the merits. But, the Johnson Court emphasized, the court of appeals
could not treat the preliminary proceeding as tantamount to an appeal
on the -merits and decide whether or not to grant leave to appeal by
appraising the entire case on terms of whether or not reversible error
appeared.
To be sure, the Johnson decision was an adoption of the Griffin
rule into the federal system. But the indigent in perfecti.ng an in forma
pauperis appeal remained at a distinct disadvantage as compared 'to the
non-indigent. The Johnson case put the burden upon the appellant
to show the trial court's certification was not warranted. However, in
Coppedge v. United States,5" the Supreme Court was presented with
an opportunity to review its decision in Johnson. Johnson was affirmed
to the extent that it was held that the indigent must be given a "record
of sufficient completeness"54 in order to enable him to demonstrate
that the district court's certification of lack of good faith was in error,
but, over the strong dissent of Justices Harlan and Clark, the burden
50. Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958). Yet, "unless the issues raised
[by the indigent seeking leave to appeal in forma pauperis were] so frivolous that
the appeal would be dismissed in the case of a non-indigent litigant .... the request
of an indigent for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must be allowed." Id. at 675. This
seems to be consistent with the Griffin rule, for if an indigent is denied appellate review
only when he presents frivolous issues, it could hardly be said that he was denied as
"adequate and effective" appellate review as that available to non-indigents.
51. 352 U.S. 565 (1957). The indigent defendant there argued that the Griiln
rule required that he be given a free stenographic transcript despite the trial court's
certification of lack of good faith. The court of appeals refused to review the trial
court's certification unless the defendant could show that the trial judge had acted in
bad faith in refusing the transcript. The Supreme Court reversed. Here, as in
Grin, petitioner, having been denied a transcript by the trial court, was effectively
cut off from appellate review when it was available to all non-indigents who could
afford a transcript. Obviously, an adequate record was necessary for the defendant
on appeal, since without it, the court of appeals could not determine whether or not
the trial court's certification was in error.
52. Id. at 566; accord, Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521 (1957).
53. 369 U.S. 438 (1962). The petitioner in Coppedge was denied leave to appeal
in forma pauperis in both the district court and court of appeals before the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
54. Id. at 446.
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was shifted to ,the Government to prove the frivolity of the indigent's
claim of error.5 5 It was now up to the Government "in opposing an
attempted criminal appeal in forma pauperis to show that the appeal
[was so] lacking in merit that the Court would dismiss the case on
motion of the Government had . . . [the appeal] been filed [by a
non-indigent] ."5 Since it was not the practice of a court of appeals
to screen paid appeals for frivolity without the benefit of hearing
argument and reviewing an adequate record of the trial proceedings,
the indigent could not be denied the same right by putting the burden
on him to establish non-frivolity. The Supreme Court, in reaching its
decision in Coppedge, cited Griffin57 and declared that it was "impelled
by considerations beyond the corners of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, considera-
tions that it is our duty to assure to the greatest degree possible, within
the statutory framework for appeals created by Congress, equal treat-
ment for every litigant before the bar." 8 That was strong equal pro-
tection language, intended to make it clear that in the future the
Griffin rationale would be the yardstick for measuring the application
of federal statutory in forma pauperis appeals.
While the Court in Coppedge required a "record of sufficient
completeness" concerning an indigent's pro se claim of errors to be
furnished on appeal of the trial court's certification of lack of good
faith, Hardy v. United States9 held that the indigent was entitled
to a free copy of the balance of the transcript if his appellate counsel
was not ,the lawyer who represented him at trial. The concurrence felt
that a full transcript should be given even if counsel on appeal were
the same as that at trial. It concluded that the whole process of screening
55. Id. at 447-48.
56. Id. at 448.
57. Id. at 447 n.13.
58. Id. at 446-47. The dissent of Justices Clark and Harlan evidenced a different
analysis of the meaning of equal protection in federal courts. They believed that the
fifth amendment prohibited "only such discriminatory legislation as amounts to a denial
of due process." Id. at 460. Concluding that it was not fundamentally unfair to require
the indigent seeking an appeal in forma pauperis to show that he was seeking review
of a non-frivolous issue, the dissent stated: "[We] see no constitutional impediment to
asking one who seeks a free ride to show that he is not just a joy rider." Ibid. This
seems to be correct upon a due process analysis, but the equal protection clause, defined
by Griffin, and as it has been read into the fifth amendment by previous decisions of
the Court, required that indigents be not discriminated against as a class. Thus, the
indigent's appeals could not be preliminarily screened without oral argument and
without a record on appeal by placing the burden on the indigent to show non-
frivolity since this was not the practice in dealing with non-indigent appeals.
59. 375 U.S. 277 (1964). Although professedly acting upon a statutory basis in
arriving at its final conclusion, it was apparent that a middle link in the chain of the
Court's reasoning was attached to the Constitution. As counsel on appeal for non-
indigents served as an advocate, it would be a denial of equal representation and thus
fundamentally unfair if counsel for indigents were held to a lesser standard. The
attorney for the non-indigent with a complete transcript was able to search the entire
record for errors to raise on appeal which could be noticed by the court of appeals,
although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. FD. R. CRIM. P.
52(b). For the indigent's counsel to thus properly serve in his constitutional capacity
as advocate, it was necessary that he too be provided with a full transcript. The
concurrence of Justices Goldberg, Warren, Brennan, and Stewart would have ex-
tended the holding to provide free full transcripts to counsel on appeal even if he
were the same counsel at trial - for only then could he "discharge his full responsi-
bility of preparing the memorandum supporting the application to proceed in forma
pauperis." Id. at 288.
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in forma pauperis appeals should be eliminated and found "no a priori
justification . . . for considering [in forma pauperis appeals] as a
class, to be more frivolous than [paid appeals]. ' '" °
After Hardy, it was apparent that given the proper case, -the
"record of sufficient completeness" demanded by Coppedge would re-
quire that a complete transcript be provided to all indigents on appeal
of -the trial court's certification of bad faith.6 1 The concurrence's sug-
gestion that the appellate screening for frivolity of indigent claims
of error be entirely eliminated would seem to be the most expedient
solution to the whole problem. At the present time -there is no denial
of equal protection by the trial court's certification of lack of good faith,
because a full review with complete transcripts is available to the
indigent with the burden upon the government to establish frivolity;
thus, the federal courts are accomplishing in two steps, in the case of
indigents, the result accomplished by one step in the case of non-
indigents.
As it has been seen, the equal protection clause has grown from
the usual last resort of constitutional argument ' 62 into an effective
weapon that is now being used to combat discrimination against the
indigent. And as it has been shown, the Griffin rule, in prohibiting
discrimination against indigents as a class, went so far as to require
affirmative action to be taken by federal as well as state courts. The
principle declared ,by Griffin resulted from the weighing of conflicting
interests and from a conscious effort by the Supreme Court to attempt
to place the indigent in a position of apparent equality with the non-
indigent, at least in the area of ensuring complete accessibility of appel-
late review to the indigent. In most instances, the Court was able to
fit the principle snugly into the concept of federalism by allowing the
states to implement the rule by means most expedient to -their own
systems of criminal -procedure. The Griffin rule, however, was only a
beginning. Griffin 'limited this beginning to the area of access to appel-
late review. This is where the Court finds itself today. Tomorrow
presents another area for the potential applicability of Griffin: the
area of bail.
The situation in which the accused indigent has found 'himself in
regard to his right to bail 'is essentially the same as that in which
the indigent in the pre-Griffin cases found himself in Tegard to his
right to appeal. The indigent before Griffin was denied access to appel-
late review because he did not have the funds with which to purchase
a transcript. The accused or convicted indigent is now denied access
to bail 'because 'he does not 'have the funds to secure a 'bond.
3
60. Id. at 295.
61. Considering the fact that the federal Coppedge rule of "sufficient complete-
ness" was applied in the parallel state case of Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487
(1963), the Court will probably now require at least those states, which allow its
appellate courts to notice spa sponte plain or fundamental error, to furnish indigents
with free complete transcripts.
62. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
63. Cf. United States v. Rumrich, 180 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1950) (per curiam).
The court said: "A person arrested upon a criminal charge, who cannot give bail, has
no recourse, but to move for trial." Id. at 576.
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The eighth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides that "Excessive bail shall not be required. . . ."' This has
been interpreted to connote a constitutional right to bail.65 Since this
is so, two immediate questions present themselves: (1) Is the setting
of bail at any amount, in the case of an -indigent, "excessive" per se,
and therefore -a violation of the eighth amendment? (2) Is the
indigent denied the equal protection of the laws because he is denied
pre-trial liberty solely on account of his poverty, when that liberty
is freely accessible to the affluent?
Although the precise question as to whether bail is "excessive"
per se if the defendant cannot meet it has never been directly decided
by the Supreme Court, the 'Court has indicated that 'bail is not
"excessive" when set at an amount higher than the defendant can
meet, if the amount set is reasonable. 6 An amount set is reasonable
if it is an amount, in the opinion of the Court, necessary to assure the
accused's presence at trial.67 This stems from the fact that a primary
purpose of bail is to assure the presence of the accused at trial; bail can
never be set in an attempt to keep the accused in jail.68 Thus, in any
case, if the bail set is reasonable, it -is not constitutionally "excessive."
The question presented as to the 'applicability of the equal pro-
tection clause in the area of bail is the next question with which we
must concern ourselves. The -first intimation that the Griffin rule might
apply to the financial barriers -erected by the bail system came from
the dissenters in Griffin itself. They queried: ". . . some [accused]
can afford 'bail, some cannot. Why fix bail at any reasonable sum
if a poor man can't make it ?,,9 The minority in Griffin would have
us believe that the indigent is not being discriminated against at all,
that the 'bond is not intended to discriminate against the poor, but
only to give the state some security that the accused will appear for
trial. But here, as in Griffin, the indigent is nonetheless being denied
a right available to the non-indigent.7" The effect of this denial, more-
over, results -in a greater injustice in the area of bail, than it did in
64. U.S. CONSr. amend. VIII.
65. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 554-55 (1952) (Black and Burton, J.J., dis-
senting) ; United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1926). Contra, Carlson
v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (civil action for deportation). Cf. Ward v. United
States, 76 S. Ct. 1063 (1956) (Frankfurter, Circuit Justice) ("The bail must be of
an amount to 'ensure the presence of the defendant.' Impliedly, the likelihood that
bail within tolerable limits will not insure this justifies denial of bail." Id. at 1066.).
66. E.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
67. Id. at 5.
68. Reynolds v. United States, 80 S. Ct. 30 (1959) (Douglas, Circuit Justice)
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); United States v. Lawrence, 26 Fed. Cas. 887
(C.C.D.C. 1835).
69. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 29 (1956).
70. ". . . The first act of the magistrate is to exact security from the defendant,
or, in case of refusal, to incarcerate him .... It is evident that such [a procedure]
is hostile to the poor and favorable only to the rich. The poor man has not always
a security to pledge .. " 1 Dg TOCQUVILLx, DEMocRAcy IN AMIERICA 55-56 (Bradley
ed. 1963); see Pelletier v. United States, 343 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Chief
Justice Bazelon dissenting said: "It is an invidious discrimination to deny appellant
release because of his poverty .. " Id. at 323. See also Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F.
Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964), where the court stated: "The theoretical equality of the
right to bail when all are not financially equal thus has become in reality a deep and
wounding social inequality, increasingly oppressive to the poor and the vagrant." Id.
at 568; dissent of Chief Justice Bazelon in Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698
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Griffin. The indigent accused, who under our system of justice is
presumed to be innocent, -is subject to the punitive aspects of detention.
The effect of remaining incarcerated will probably result in the loss
of his job, of his respect in the community, and in ill feelings toward
his family, even if the indigent is subsequently acquitted. 71 In addition,
the accused indigent's defense is put to a serious handicap. He will not
be free to help locate important witnesses. He will not have the oppor-
tunity to frequently contact his attorney. And if detention has resulted
in the loss of the indigent's job, he may not ,be able to even retain an
attorney. The indigent who is denied the right to bail will feel the
effect at the most important level of criminal procedure - at the trial
level, where 'if the accused were adequately and effectively defended,
there would exist no need for appellate review at all.
The best indication -to date that the Griffin rule might apply in
the field of bail is the dictum expounded by Mr. Justice Douglas while
serving as circuit justice in the cases of Bandy v. United States.72 In
1960,7a Douglas stated: "We have held that an indigent defendant
is denied equal protection of the laws if he is denied an appeal on
equal terms with other defendants, solely because of 'his indigence."74
He then -asked: "Can an indigent be denied freedom, where a wealthy
man would not, because he does not happen to have enough property
to pledge for his freedom ?"7' He continued: "It would be unconstitu-
tional to fix excessive bail to assure that a defendant will not gain his
freedom. . . Yet in the case of an indigent defendant, the fixing of
bail in even a modest amount may have the practical effect of denying
his release."' 76 In 1961,' 7 Douglas reconsidered ,the question ,he posed
in 1960 and said: ". . . [N]o man should be denied release because of
indigence. . . . A man is entitled to release on personal recognizance
. . . [unless the Government] . . . overcome[s] heavy presumptions
favoring freedom. '7'  Bandy's petition for certiorari, however, was
denied by the Supreme Court,"9 and although it is not proper to draw
(D.C. Cir. 1963) ("[The] release [of the indigent defendant] is barred because of...
financial condition. . .. [This is an] unconstitutional discrimination against the poor."
Id. at 701-02).
71. See generally Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. Riv. 641(1964); Foote, Marble and Wooley, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administra-
tion of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. RFv. 1031 (1954).
72. 81 S. Ct. 197 (1960) ; 85 S. Ct. 11 (1961). For the extensive history of the
Bandy case, see Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv.
1125, 1154 n.274 (1965).
73. 81 S. Ct. 197, 198 (1960). Bandy, who couldn't give security for his bail
set at $5,000 by the district court, petitioned for his "release on personal recognizance"
under rule 46(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, pending the dis-
position of his petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.
74. Id. at 197.
75. Id. at 198.
76. Ibid. However, Justice Douglas denied the petition for release without preju-
dice and sent the case back to the district court where he felt the facts could be
better explored.
77. 82 S. Ct. 11 (1961). After the district court refused to lower the $5,000 bail
or release Bandy on personal recognizance, he again petitioned Douglas.
78. Id. at 13. But Justice Douglas again refused Bandy's application for release
and held that when relief granted by a single Justice would render moot Bandy's
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, in which he asked for review of the
court of appeals' denial of reduction of bail, relief would not be granted.
79. 368 U.S. 852 (1961).
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conclusions on the merits of a claim by the denial of certiorari, it
seemed that the Court was just not ready to accept Douglas' dictum
and extend the Griffin rule into the area of bail. This can possibly be
partially explained by the Court's reluctance to impose too many
socio-economic burdens upon state and federal courts at one time
and by the need for effective means of implementing the principle
to be declared."0
But between 1961 and today, an important pronouncement of -the
Supreme Court in the area of appellate review evidenced a distinct
parallel between those equal protection cases and -the problem posed by
the indigent's right to bail. In Lane v. Brown,"' the Court invalidated
an Indiana statute by which the transcript required for an appeal from
a denial of a writ of coram nobis could be obtained by an indigent
only in the discretion of the Public Defender. The vice found by the
Court in this procedure was that it ". . . confer[red] upon a state
officer outside the judicial system power to take from an indigent all
hope of any appeal . ,,." In bail practice, the same vice is present:
".. . the professional bondsmen hold -the keys to the jail in [their]
pockets. . . .The 'bad risks, in the bondsmen's judgment, and the
ones who are unable to pay the bondsmen's fee, remain in jail."8 "
It would seem that a practice held to be unconstitutional in the area
of appellate review should likewise be held unconstitutional in the
area of bail.
Although there is a distinct scarcity of cases in this field, -it is
apparent that when ,the Court is ready to extend the principle an-
nounced in Griffin, the area of bail will be an enticing forerunner.
When the inequities bestowed upon the indigent due to his denial
of bail are placed upon today's scales of justice and weighed against
the interest of the -state, i.e., the need to assure an accused's presence
at trial, the scales, ito be sure, will tip in favor of the indigent. The de-
terrent of serious punishment for "jumping bail,"" and the effectiveness
80. But see COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RULES oF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS, Proposed Amendment 46(d) (2d Prelim. Draft 1964) :
The Commissioner or judge or justice, having regard to the considerations
set forth in subdivision (c), may require one or more sureties, may authorize the
acceptance of cash or bonds or notes of the United States in an amount equal to
or less than the face amount of the bond, or may authorize the release of the
defendant without security upon such conditions as may be prescribed to ensure
his appearance. Each person admitted to bail shall have called to his attention the
penalties imposed by law for willful failure to appear in accordance with the
terms of the bail.
81. See note 32 supra.
82. 372 U.S. at 485.
83. Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J.,
concurring).
84. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1964)
Whoever, having been admitted to bail for appearance before any United
States Commissioner or court of the United States, incurs a forfeiture of bail
and willfully fails to surrender himself within thirty days following the date of
such forfeiture, shall, if the bail was given in connection with a charge of felony
or pending appeal or certiorari after conviction of any offense, be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; or, if the bail was
given in connection with a charge of committing a misdemeanor, or for appearance




of modern police practices in locating and apprehending fugitives from
justice are sufficient means -through which -the -state and federal govern-
ment can be assured of the bailed defendant's presence at trial. In
the words of an eminent authority in the field of criminal procedural
reform:
The words "excessive bail" [found in the eighth amendment]
. . . must be given an interpretation consistent with the Griffin
rule as forbidding any financial discrimination against the accused.
Such an interpretation pierces the literal guarantee and focuses
upon the fundamental interests with which the amendment is con-
cerned: the right not to be punished before conviction and the
right not to be prejudiced before trial."'
In conclusion, it can be said that this is only the 'beginning. The
equal protection clause has grown in its application and it will continue
to grow, slowly but surely, case by case, until the equality of treatment
in criminal procedure demanded by our system of law will be secure
to all.
85. Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. Riv. 1125,
1180 (1965).
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